The link between firms engaging in open source software (OSS) development and the OSS community is established by individual developers. This linkage might entail a principalagent issue due to the developer's double allegiance to firm and OSS community, and expose the firm to the risk of losing intellectual property. Using both interviews and a large-scale survey, I substantiate the importance of the developer's role. However, neither interview data nor regression analysis show indications of commercially harmful revealing behavior induced by "Free Software ideology." Management, on the other hand, sometimes seems to be overly concerned about openness. I conclude that a more positive stance towards openness will allow firms to better share in the benefits of open innovation processes.
Introduction
The last decade has seen a radical change in the way software is developed and deployed. The Linux operating system and many other types of open source software (OSS) are by now widely adopted by established corporations, both within and outside the IT industry. Nokia and Philips are prominent examples (Engelfriet, 2006; Jaaksi, 2006) . They, as numerous other firms, not only adopted existing OSS programs-they also adopted, certainly in some areas, the OSS approach to software development. Contrary to the traditional emphasis put on the protection of intellectual property, this approach implies making developments publicly available, without contractual guarantees of obtaining anything in return. By going far beyond contract-based collaboration (e.g., Arora et al., 2001) , it can be considered an extreme instance of "open innovation" (Chesbrough, 2003) . These fundamental changes pose a challenge to corporations.
In this paper, I focus on a central aspect of this novel open innovation process, namely, the role of the employed OSS programmer. As an employee of his firm and a member of the OSS community, he likely feels loyalty to both entities. This double allegiance can be helpful and even necessary (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006) . However, it may also give rise to principal-agent problems, since both information asymmetry and potentially diverging interests are present: A developer will often know better than his supervisor about the benefits and risks of making public a piece of code he has been working on, and he might even reveal it without his supervisor's knowledge. As to the developer's motivation, OSS supporters sometimes subscribe to ideological views on the "freedom of software" (Stallman, 1999; Hertel et al., 2003) . Quite generally, the personal goals of engineers often differ from those of their employer (Allen, 1988) , and an employee's affiliation to a community of practice (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Lee and Cole, 2003) may conflict with the loyalty to her company (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001 ).
This potential principal-agent problem is compounded by the fact that employed OSS developers hold a key position in the interaction between firm and community. Most firms engaged in OSS development do not disclose all of their developments. Rather, they follow a hybrid strategy, protecting some of their developments while disclosing others as OSS (e.g., . Even developments based on existing OSS are typically selectively revealed (Henkel, 2006) . This way, the firm can reap the benefits of open innovation where these prevail, and can avoid a loss of competitive edge otherwise-provided, of course, the decision to reveal is well advised. This decision is (or should be) guided by general company guidelines, and will in any concrete case be influenced by the individual OSS programmer involved. Being familiar with the technical merits of the code he will often be best positioned to judge the prospective benefits and potential downsides of releasing it to the OSS commu-
nity.
Participating in open and distributed development of OSS thus requires leaving some discretion to programmers. However, in light of the agency issues sketched above it needs to be analyzed if they abuse this discretion. As participants in public OSS projects they might reveal code which, in the firm's commercial interest, should rather be protected. To avoid such leakage, the employer might forbid revealing of code altogether which, however, would also mean to forgo the potential benefits of the OSS development process (Feller and Fitzgerald, 2002) . In addition, what management deems an excessively "open" attitude among its OSS developers may in fact be beneficial for the firm, while management overestimates the risks of openness.
In this paper, I analyze the role of employed OSS programmers in the context described above, focusing on a field of OSS-"embedded Linux" 1 -which is dominated by commercial firms. To obtain a robust picture of the subject of study and to increase validity and reliability of findings, I employ methodological triangulation. Based on 30 in-depth interviews and a large-scale survey (268 respondents) I show that developers have a strong say in the decision to reveal code to public OSS projects, and that excessive or untimely disclosure would be harmful to firms. Interviews as well as survey data on respondents' attitudes point indeed to a potential principal-agent problem between the developer and his firm. However, comparing commercial and non-commercial programmers (those working for non-profit institutions or as hobbyists) shows that the former identify significantly less with the OSS community, and are significantly less ideological about the "freedom of software." More importantly, an analysis of the actual determinants of revealing, using ordered probit regressions, does not support the surmise of a principal-agent problem. Neither the respondent's level of "Free Software ideol-1 "Embedded Linux" denotes variants of the OSS operating system which are "embedded" in products ranging from consumer DVD players to control systems for industrial production machines. See Section 4.1.
ogy" nor personal pride in his code are found to be drivers of revealing. Also the level of importance he attaches to reasons to reveal related to the OSS community and his personal benefits have no apparent effect on his contributing behavior. What does have a strong effect on a respondent's revealing behavior, however, is his level of identification with the OSS community. As interview quotes as well as the above findings suggest, this identification is not so much ideological, but most likely due to positive experiences with technical support-and hence beneficial for the firm.
Based on these findings, evidence from interviews, and technical arguments I conclude that the principal-agent problem between the employed OSS programmer and his firm should not be severe. Rather, my data suggest that the programmer often acts as a "champion 2 of revealing," advocating his firm's participation in open and collaborative innovation processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on commercial OSS development, the motives of individual OSS programmers, and their role as members of two entities. In Section 3, research questions and hypotheses are derived. Section 4 describes the empirical approach. In Section 5, results on the role of the developer, respondents' attitudes, and determinants of revealing are presented. Section 6 concludes.
Background

Commercial OSS development
A number of authors have addressed the question why commercial firms would actively take part in public OSS development. 3 The main potential benefits for firms that have been identified are external development support, setting a standard and enabling compatibility, increasing demand for complements, and signaling technical excellence or good OSS citizenship.
Against these benefits, a number of potential downsides must be weighed. Software that is 2 On the concept of "champions" see, e.g., Howell and Higgins (1990) .
3
See Behlendorf (1999) , Hecker (1999) , Raymond (1999), Feller and Fitzgerald (2002) , Lerner and Tirole (2002) , Wichmann (2002) , West (2003) , , Dahlander (2004) , Gruber and Henkel (2005) , Gassmann (2006) , Henkel (2006) , West and Gallagher (2006), and Dahlander (2007) . On the issue of collaborative innovation processes, see in particular von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) and Osterloh and Rota (2007) .
freely available as OSS can no longer be sold-customers will at best be willing to pay for convenient packaging. Furthermore, such software can be used by competitors, which may imply a loss of competitive advantage. In addition, the original author of the software might lose control over its future development.
Despite these downsides, many firms do engage in OSS development, and likely do benefit from it. In fact, most of the benefits mentioned above are not at odds with wide diffusion of the software, but rather rely on it. In addition, despite the software being OSS firms have various means of protection at their disposal which range from a suitable choice of license (Behlendorf, 1999; Hecker, 1999; Raymond, 1999) to standard means of protection such as copyright, secrecy, lead time, and complementary assets (Teece, 1986; Feller and Fitzgerald, 2002; Dahlander, 2004) . The latter are available even in the case of OSS under the GPL, and are consciously and routinely used by commercial firms (Henkel, 2006) . Also patents and trademarks may serve as complementary assets (Fosfuri et al., 2008) . As a result, most commercial players in the field of OSS adopt a hybrid strategy between the extremes of purely open and purely proprietary development (West, 2003; . They selectively reveal some of their developments in order to benefit from the OSS community (Dahlander and Magnusson, 2005) while protecting others (Henkel, 2006) . In this context, it is important to note that "the OSS community" is a rather heterogeneous aggregation of individuals. At the very least, these must be distinguished, for any given public OSS project, into those being paid by a firm for their work on the project ("commercial developers") and those who are not ("non-commercial developers"). As I will elaborate upon in the following subsection and in Section 3, motivations and external conditions should differ strongly between these groups.
Motivation of OSS programmers
The fact that individuals contribute to OSS without being directly remunerated is one of the most startling aspects of OSS. Various authors have attempted to explain this behavior seemingly at odds with the concept of homo oeconomicus. 4 Large-scale surveys (Ghosh et al., 4 Torvalds considers the fun and challenge of programming as key drivers (Torvalds and Diamond, 2001 ), while Raymond (1999) stresses the quest for peer recognition. Other authors emphasize economic motivations, in particular adapting software to one's use requirements (Franke and von Hippel, 2003; von Hippel, 2002; Hars and Ou, 2002; Hertel et al., 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005) found intrinsic motives (intellectual stimulation, improving skills) ranking highest. They were followed by, in varying order, adapting the software to one's use requirements and motives related to community, reciprocity, and ideology (in particular the view that "information should be free").
Particularly relevant for this paper are two aspects. First, in all surveys the share of respondents who are paid for their development work is considerable. Lakhani and Wolf (2005) , for example, identify 40% as "paid," accounting for more than half of total hours spent on OSS development in the sample. In addition, Lakhani and Wolf find that for 30.7% of the OSS developers who spend work time on an OSS project, the supervisor is not aware of their OSS-related activity.
Hence, principal-agent problems are possible and might affect the role of the programmer as the link between company and community. By focusing on a segment of OSS in which Osterloh and Rota, 2007) , and signaling competence and skills to the job market (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Franck and Jungwirth, 2003; . 
Organizational identification -Between company and community
If a firm benefits from its OSS engagement depends to a large extent on its employed OSS developers. While firm policies certainly matter, it is, as my data show, often the individual programmer who advocates and possibly also decides about revealing a particular piece of code to the OSS community or not. 6 Cases of such "champions of revealing" are reported by Henkel (2004a) who describes the cases of "CEPS" ("Cisco Enterprise Printing System", earlier mentioned by Raymond, 1999) and "OpenAdaptor", a middleware developed by the investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein. These software packages were released as OSS in 1997 and 2001, respectively. In both cases, the idea of going OSS was conceived and championed by the maintainers of the software.
The programmer also determines his firm's reputation within the respective OSS project by submitting more or less helpful and competent comments and code. Both revealing the right code and having a good reputation are preconditions for benefiting from external development support, and also influence if diffusion-related benefits are realized. In turn, revealing the wrong piece of code can imply a loss of competitive advantage, may reveal an infringement on some third party intellectual property right, or may restrict the firm's options for commercializing its code more than is acceptable. In addition, inappropriate behavior by the developer in the OSS community will do damage to the firm's reputation.
To a good extent, monitoring-and even the mere possibility of it-helps to mitigate these risks. Contributions to mailing lists and code repositories of public OSS projects are preserved for a long time, and can be checked when the suspicion of incorrect behavior arises.
In addition, a firm can keep logs of all data leaving its network. These rather broad monitoring possibilities distinguish the present case of disclosures from, e.g., information sharing in strategic alliances (Hamel et al., 1989) .
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Similar discretion on lower hierarchical levels with respect to information sharing has been reported by Hamel et al. (1989) for the case of strategic alliances, and by Schrader (1991) and Dahl and Pedersen (2004) for the case of information trading (see also von Hippel, 1987). As Hamel et al. (1989, p. 136) (Henkel, 2004a) . Programmers working for competitors of Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein were typically barred by their labor contracts from sharing any of their code with anyone. As a result, the maintainers of OpenAdaptor received "a lot of anonymous contributions." Interestingly, these illegitimate disclosures were most likely beneficial for the respective firms, since they led to future versions of the software being improved or even adapted to specific needs of the submitters. In contrast, a competitive disadvantage from improving a competitor's middleware appears unlikely. It thus seems that the legal departments had taken an overly restrictive stance on openness.
The above implies that commercial OSS programmers' motivation, attitude, and loyalties are of central importance in our context. In particular, the issue of double allegiance, or multiple identities, arises. As argued above, these multiple identities of employed OSS programmers are indispensable if the firm is to take full advantage of OSS, and firms may even employ individuals to act as dedicated boundary spanners between them and an OSS community (Dahlander and Wallin, 2006) . However, in a particular situation these identities may be conflicting. Following Ashforth and Johnson (2001) , a commercial OSS programmer's identities as an employee on the one hand and as a member of a public OSS project on the other hand are instances of "cross-cutting" identities. Their relative salience (e.g., Stryker, 1980) determines if the programmer, in a situation of conflict, acts in his firm's or his community's
interest. An identity's salience, in turn, is determined by its situational relevance and subjective importance (Ashforth, 2001) . Situational relevance of the developer's "OSS identity" will likely be highest (and thus most relevant) when he needs to decide about sharing some code or keeping it secret, since sharing is at the heart of the OSS idea. Its subjective importance, in contrast, is relatively stable over time, and can be captured by survey questions.
The role of employed programmers at the interface between their firm and the OSS community is determined by an external and an internal factor. The external factor are firm policies with respect to revealing, in particular the discretion the developer has. The internal factor are his personal attitudes towards revealing and OSS. Both are expected to influence his revealing behavior. In the following, I formulate research questions and hypotheses regarding the above three issues.
Firm policies. How strongly a developer's attitudes and behavior impact his firm in the context of commercial OSS development depends on the discretion that his firm leaves him, and on the firm's general policy towards revealing. Does he have strict guidelines to follow, does he discuss each case with his supervisor, or is the decision largely left to his own discretion? Is an official firm policy on revealing in place, and is it supportive or restrictive? And, when revealing does occur, is the supervisor aware of it?
Attitudes. An employed OSS programmer belongs both to his company and to the OSS community. As laid out in Section 2.3, the relative salience (Stryker, 1980 ) of these two identities determines in whose interest he acts in cases of conflict, that of his company or that of the OSS community (Ashforth and Johnson, 2001) . These interests will often be aligned, but will differ in some cases. The risk that the programmer, in such cases, acts in a way harmful to his company is arguably higher the higher the subjective importance of his "OSS identity"
is to him (Ashforth, 2001 ). This importance is derived from his identification with the OSS community and the extent to which he shares positive ideological views, in particular on the "freedom of software." While it is hard to say which absolute level of OSS identification and ideology is critical for an employer, the attitudes of non-commercial programmers working in the same field provide a natural benchmark. There are good reasons to assume that the two groups differ. For commercial programmers, their job provides a motivation to work on OSS, which is absent for non-commercial developers. Hence, in order to have a sufficiently strong overall motivation for working on OSS, the threshold level of non-job-related motivation needs to be higher for non-commercial than for commercial programmers. Under plausible assumptions 7 it follows that also the average level of non-job-related motivation should be 7
This statement holds true when the shape of the distribution of non-job-related motivation levels does not differ too much between the two groups of programmers.
higher for non-commercial programmers. The most relevant sources of such motivation in the context of principal-agent issues are, as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, their attitude towards "Free Software ideology" and their identification with the OSS community. 8 In addition, commercial OSS programmers will often also work on proprietary software since it constitutes a part of the business model of many firms developing OSS (e.g., West, 2003; Dahlander, 2004; Fosfuri et al., 2008) . In order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) , they should thus have a more positive attitude towards proprietary software and less ideological views on OSS. I thus posit the following two hypotheses.
H1a: Commercial programmers identify less strongly with the OSS community than
non-commercial programmers.
H1b: Commercial programmers share positive ideological views on the "freedom of software" to a lesser extent than non-commercial programmers.
Reasons to reveal. Just as their non-commercial counterparts, commercial OSS programmers reveal code partly out of motives not related to their firm's benefits, as reviewed in Section 2.2. These can be divided into community-related motives and those linked to the programmer's personal benefits-or, as Simon et al. (1998) phrase it in the context of social movement participation more generally, motives based on collective identification and costbenefit calculations. Both types of reasons should matter more for non-commercial than for commercial programmers. As to community-related motives, the argument proceeds along the same lines as for attitudes. Also with regard to personal reasons to reveal code (learning, signaling to the job market), a similar logic should apply: given that the motive "code needed for my work"-by far the most important one for commercial programmers in the study by Lakhani and Wolf (2005)-is irrelevant for non-commercial programmers, other motives need to 8 On the motives of (commercial and non-commercial) OSS programmers see Ghosh et al. (2002) , Hars and Ou (2002), Hertel et al. (2003) , and Lakhani and Wolf (2005) . On motivation based on collective identification and how it interacts with other sources of motivation, see Klandermans (1997) and Simon et al. (1998) .
be of higher relevance for them. For "learning" in particular, this consideration is clearly supported by Lakhani and Wolf (2005) . 9 These considerations lead to the following hypotheses.
H2a: For commercial programmers, community-related reasons to reveal matter less than for non-commercial programmers.
H2b: For commercial programmers, reasons to reveal related to personal benefits (learning, signaling) matter less than for non-commercial programmers.
Revealing behavior. I now turn to commercial programmers' actual revealing behavior.
After all, even an employee's most radical ideological views on the "freedom of software" Note that the direction of the effects dealt with in Hypotheses H3 to H8, developed below, is mostly not surprising, which is also why deriving the hypotheses is not too sophisticated.
However, it is not at all clear if they are significant since, e.g., developers might simply ignore and circumvent restrictive firm policies.
As to firm policies, it is very plausible that a restrictive firm policy towards revealing code should impact a developer's contributions negatively, while an encouraging policy should have a positive effect (Hypothesis H3, see below). A person's identification with the OSS community has been found to influence the extent of that person's contributions to public OSS projects positively (Hertel et al., 2003) as, more generally, participation in collective action is furthered by identification (Simon et al., 1998) . This leads to Hypothesis H4. A fur-ther potential motivator for contributing is "ideology" related to the "freedom of software." A political position supportive of the "freedom of software" leads, nearly by definition, to the hypothesis that a developer who shares stronger ideological views on Free Software contributes more (H5). 10 Raymond (1999) argued that OSS developers might share their work because they strive for reputation among their peers. To that purpose, code to be proud of should be best suited, and programmers who take pride in their work should be most likely to use it to impress others. This implies Hypothesis H6. Finally, one should expect a developer to contribute more the more importance he attaches to reasons to reveal related to the OSS community (H7) and his personal benefits (H8 
Empirical approach
Embedded Linux
I study the behavior of OSS programmers in commercial firms for the case of "embedded Linux." The term denotes versions of the open source operating system Linux that are "embedded" in products which are, unlike PCs or laptop computers, dedicated to a single purpose.
Examples range from consumer DVD players over cell phones and payment terminals to control systems for industrial production machines. Using Linux in such devices has become very common over the last years (Webb, 2002; . It is today one of the three most widely used embedded operating systems (VDC 2004).
10 Note that this hypothesis is not at odds with H1b. While H1b hypothesizes about the difference of ideology levels between commercial and non-commercial programmers, H5 concerns the effect of different ideology levels within the group of commercial programmers.
Since devices and thus the requirements to the operating system are extremely heterogeneous, there is no standard version of embedded Linux. Rather, "embedded Linux" refers to various versions of Linux that are, in one way or another, adapted to embedded systems. Examples for such adaptations are the RTAI real-time module ("Real-Time Application Interface"), the toolkit busybox, the shrinked C library uclibc, and processor-specific code.
Heterogeneity of embedded Linux marks an important difference to more homogeneous OSS packages such as standard Linux. It implies, among other things, that free riding on developments performed by others is restricted and that standardization is much less relevant.
Firms in this field thus face a rather different situation than, e.g., the Linux distributor Red
Hat.
New developments based on existing embedded Linux code are to be regarded as "derived work" in the sense of the GPL license, which governs the use of Linux. This implies that, by the time a device containing embedded Linux comes onto the market, the source code of the version of Linux it contains must be made available to all buyers. Furthermore, patents play hardly any role in this field. 11 Still, considerable leeway does exist with respect to revealing or protecting one's developments for embedded Linux (Henkel, 2006) : It can be given only to paying customers, who often prefer to keep the code secret; revealing can be delayed until the device comes to market, which is on average 18 months after the code was written;
and by using "binary loadable modules" for drivers, revealing can be avoided altogether.
Embedded Linux is well suited for the question at hand since, as will become clear below, most contributions to public embedded Linux projects come from commercial firms.
This implies that the "OSS community" referred to in the present context mainly consists of commercial programmers.
Interviews
A total of 30 in-depth interviews were conducted by the author in the period between May 2002 and June 2003. Of the interviewees, the largest group (13) worked for software firms 11 Fosfuri et al. (2008) analyze the use of patents, among others, as complementary assets by firms releasing software products under OSS licenses. Yet, in the specific field of embedded Linux patents do play only a minor role. This is due to the fact that, for hardware firms, their hardware serves as a protecting complementary asset, while most software firms perform commissioned development instead of selling standardized software products. Others (e.g., Montavista) rely on brand and warranties as complementary assets.
specializing on embedded Linux; six were employed by hardware manufacturers using embedded Linux; seven were industry experts; and four were indirectly dealing with embedded Linux, mostly as sellers of competing products. Most interviews (28) were conducted as oral conversations, two by e-mail. Of the 28 oral interviews, 18 were electronically recorded; in 10 cases handwritten notes were taken. The average length of the interviews was 53 minutes.
They were transcribed and analyzed using the software "AnSWR" to perform a qualitative content analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) . During the process of open coding, a hierarchical category scheme was developed consisting of 137 categories. In total, 657 relevant text segments were identified and assigned to one or more categories.
The focus of the interviews was on the peculiarities of the open source development process in an environment dominated by commercial firms, not hobbyists. In particular, it addressed collaboration between OSS programmers employed by competing firms. The clear majority of participants (73.5%) indicated that they develop embedded Linux as part of their job working for a commercial firm. Of these, two thirds work for hardware firms (51.1% in total; 42.5% for device manufacturers, 8.6% for component manufacturers), about one third (22.4%) for software firms. In the following, I refer to these respondents as "commercial" developers.
Survey
Set-up and respondents
The remaining 26.5% of respondents identified themselves as "hobbyist" (15.3%) or as working for "University or other non-profit research organization" (11.2%). Hobbyists in the sample work less hours per week than commercial programmers (contributing only about 7%
of total hours per week in the sample), and will likely be overrepresented in the survey due to self-selection. Hence, hobbyists indeed play only a minor role in embedded Linux development. Still, even though relatively small, the group of non-commercial programmers provides a very useful benchmark for analyzing characteristics of commercial developers.
Variables
In Section 5.2, I will first provide a descriptive analysis of firm policies. To identify these policies, participants were offered five statements and were asked to tick those that apply (see Table 1 ). The dummy variables coding an encouraging and a restrictive policy were subtracted to yield the index "PolSupportiveIndex," to be used in the regression. In addition, participants were asked how often their supervisor was aware of their sharing code, both generally and with direct competitors. Responses are described in Section 5.2.
Insert Table 1 about here
Next, I will analyze differences between commercial and non-commercial programmers with respect to their attitudes. The latter were measured as the level of agreement to various statements, on a scale from -2 ("strongly disagree") to +2 ("strongly agree"), see Table 2 .
Identification with the OSS community (variable name "OSSidentification", H1a) is meas- Table 3 ), the relevance of which was again measured on a 5-point scale.
Insert Table 2 about here   Insert Table 3 about here
In the multivariate regression, I use the frequency of code contributions to public embedded Linux projects as the dependent variable, measured on a five-point scale (never, once 12 "Ideology" is, both generally and in the context of OSS and Free Software, a complex object. I focus on the specific aspect of the "freedom of software," since by definition this element of ideology should impact directly on the respondent's attitude towards revealing (which amounts to "making software free"). Given that the term "Free Software" is a hallmark of the Free Software Foundation (FSF) which is known for its ideological stance (Stallman, 1999) , the statement should indeed capture ideological views of the respondent.
a year, once a month, once a week, several times per week). 13 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4 .
Insert Table 4 about here Explanatory variables not yet described above are the following (see Table 5 ). "ReasonsCommunity" and "ReasonsPersonalBenefits" are indices comprising several items describing motives to reveal related to the OSS community and to personal benefits. Table 6. 13 Ideally, one would like to have a quality-weighted measure of the quantity of code that is submitted. However, questions about the quality of submitted code would have been hard to answer, and the answers even harder to compare between respondents. Also a pure quantity measure such as lines of code is not satisfying since large pieces of code may be submitted that have been recycled from some other software program. Cronbach's α of 0.52 (ReasonsCommunity) and 0.84 (ReasonsPersBenef), respectively. Given the rather similar meaning of the items entering ReasonsCommunity, the alpha value is surprisingly low. However, using these items separately in the regression yields coefficients which are just as insignificant. This shows that no relevant results are affected by using the index versus using the individual items.
Insert Table 5 about here   Insert Table 6 about here
Results
In this section, I first provide qualitative evidence concerning the role of commercial OSS programmers. I then present a descriptive analysis of survey data on programmers' roles and attitudes, before analyzing correlates of revealing using regression analysis. Both 5.1 and the beginning of 5.2 are thus dealing with research questions which are not linked to hypotheses.
Testing Hypotheses 1 to 8 is the subject of the second part of 5.2.
Qualitative evidence
In the following, I provide qualitative evidence for four propositions: (1) Quotes (a) to (c) show that firms may selectively protect their developments by delaying disclosure. Going beyond delaying, firms may also try to avoid revealing altogether, as illustrated by quotes (d) to (f). 
When for these boards and their periphery a driver is developed, then this driver contains specific, [Firm X]-internal protocols. When you put these drives as open source on the web, [Competitor Y] can come along and replicate the device easily. In that case, we have a lot of intellectual property on kernel level." (Interviewee 3, embedded Linux vendor, Europe)
(2) Most interviewees contended that embedded Linux developers are rather pragmatic about the "freedom of software." Still, they considered that "Free Software ideology" does play a certain role. Also other personal motives such as pride and altruism matter, as the following quotes (g) and (h) illustrate. Summarizing, the interviews and in particular the quotes given above support the propositions put down at the outset of this section. In the next section, these qualitative insights are complemented by quantitative results.
(g)"Clearly there are humans behind it and to a certain extent what counts most in this kind
Survey
The role of developers
Regarding firm policies (see Table 1 ), the statement "There is no official policy" received by far the highest level of agreement (46.7% of all respondents working for commercial firms, N = 197). While it might be that firms deliberately leave some ambiguity in order to react to commercially harmful acts of revealing in a flexible way, the more likely explanation seems to be that setting up an official policy has, so far, not been considered. Supervisors' awareness of code sharing by their developers is relatively high. More than half (50.7%) of all commercial respondents who answered this question (N = 169) stated that their supervisor was "always" aware of it. "Often" or "sometimes" was ticked by 41.4%, and only 6.6% said that their supervisor was "rarely" or "never" aware. In the more critical case of sharing code with direct competitors, a much higher share of respondents (71.3% of N = 136) said that their supervisor was "always" aware of their code sharing. 16.9% stated that the supervisor was "often" or "sometimes" aware, and 11.8% ticked "rarely" or "never". While a social desirability bias in these responses can not be excluded, it will likely not be strong since anonymous and confidential treatment of responses was credibly assured.
These findings show that the developer is indeed of central importance in defining his
firm's role in public OSS projects. In at least half of the cases in the sample, it is him who suggests or selects code to be made public-a crucial choice both for exploiting the opportu-nities of public OSS development and for avoiding its risks. The number of respondents who do not inform their supervisors when sharing code with direct competitors is relatively small (11.8%), but non-negligible. This finding may either mean that (a few) developers constitute potential leaks, or that they-consciously, but in the firm's best interest-disregard management's overly restrictive rules on revealing. In order to better understand how the developer uses his discretion a look at his attitudes and personal reasons to reveal is warranted.
Developers' attitude towards OSS
The statement "I identify with the open source community" received a relatively high level of agreement from both groups (see Table 2 ). Still, agreement from commercial developers is significantly lower: "I somewhat agree" or "I strongly agree" was ticked by 81.4% of commercial and 92.3% of non-commercial developers, and a Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis of equal medians on the 10% level (p = 0.06). Hence, hypothesis H1a is supported.
Identification with the OSS community may be entirely pragmatic, based on positive experiences with external development support. In contrast, subscription to the view that "Free Software matters because all freedom matters" does reveal an ideological attitude. The respective levels of agreement to this statement are lower than the levels given above, and differ more clearly between commercial developers (64.5% "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree") and non-commercial developers (78.8%). A test on differences of medians is highly significant (p = 0.003). Thus, also H1b is supported. Commercial OSS programmers do, on average, identify with the OSS community are are even slightly ideological about the "freedom of software," but significantly less so than the reference group.
17
17 With respect to H1a and H1b, a very interesting question arises: are the differences due to learning or to selection? In other words, do OSS programmers adopt over time, after they became employed to work on embedded software, a less ideological and less community-oriented attitude (see Westenholz, 2003) ? Or do those OSS programmers become employed who are less ideological and less community-oriented in the first place (see Alexy and Leitner, 2008) ? While a comprehensive analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper, some preliminary results are the following. With respect to FreeSWideology, a selection effect seems to dominate since the variable is not correlated with the number of years the respondent has been developing embedded Linux (variable "DevelYearsEL") which, for commercial developers, is a good proxy for being exposed to commercial OSS work. Furthermore, the two groups of commercial developers who had (group C1) resp. had not (group C2) worked on OSS before working on embedded software do not differ significantly w.r.t. FreeSWideology. In contrast, for the variable OSSidentification the groups C1 and that of As reviewed in Section 2.2, also personal pride taken in one's software developments might matter for a person's revealing behavior. However, since it appears less clear than in the cases above if the two groups should differ in this respect, I did not posit a hypothesis. As Table 2 shows, both groups show pride in their work, and do not differ significantly.
Regarding respondents' community-related and personal reasons to reveal, differences between the two groups of respondents are much less clear. As Table 3 shows, agreement to community-related reasons to reveal ("I reveal code because I consider it fair to give back to the community" and "I reveal code because, in the long run, you only get something when you gave something before") is only slightly higher for non-commercial developers, and the difference is insignificant. H2a is thus not supported. As to personal motives, agreement to "I reveal code because I get feedback on my code, which improves my personal skills" is significantly higher for non-commercial programmers (p = 0.028), while for the motive to "demonstrate my skills to future employers" no significant difference can be found. H2b thus receives mixed support. Regarding the absolute levels of importance across both groups, I find that the motive "to give back to the community" receives the highest agreement (mean / median = 1.62 / 2), followed by "feedback on my code" (0.96 / 1) and reciprocity (0.90 / 1). Signaling to potential future employers matters little for both groups (0.32 / 0).
Correlates of revealing behavior
Results of the multivariate analysis of respondents' code contributions are shown in Tables 7   and 8 . 18 I employ ordered probit regression, with three specifications. Specification (1) contains the index PolSupportiveIndex, (2) contains the individual variables PolEncouraging and PolRestrictive. Since these can partly be explained by the firm's basic characteristics as described by the control variables (size, type, experience with embedded Linux), alternative non-commercial programmers do not differ, while both differ strongly significantly from the group C2. In addition, for the latter group OSSidentification is highly significantly correlated with DevelYearsEL (rho = 0.27, p = 0.002). In sum, these findings do suggest a learning effect -however, not for OSS developers turned (commercial) embedded Linux programmers, but rather for commercial developers of embedded software who later started working on OSS, and learned about the benefits of the OSS community.
18 Since the categories once a week and several times per week of the dependent variable contained relatively few responses (7 and 9, respectively, corresponding to 6.0% / 7.7% of all 117 observations in the regression), these categories were merged in an alternative specification. Since the regression results remained nearly unchanged I report only the specification using all five categories. specification (3) leaves out the policy variables. 19 Variables insignificant in the full specifications (1a), (2a), and (3a) were successively eliminated, leading to the respective final model.
A Wald test confirms joint insignificance of the eliminated variables in all three cases.
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Insert Table 7 about here   Insert Table 8 about here As expected, a supportive policy towards revealing has a positive effect on the frequency of code contributions in specifications (1a) and (1b) which is significant on the 1% level, confirming H3. Marginal effects are reported for Table 7 . 21 Breaking up the index into its constituents (specifications 2a, 2b) yields a significant effect (5% level) of an encouraging policy. A restrictive policy, while it does have a negative effect of about the same size just fails to be significant at the 10% level.
Of the three variables relating to the developer's attitudes, "FreeSWideology" and "Pride" do not exhibit a significant effect in any specification. Thus, for H5 and H6 the null hypothesis that an ideological attitude resp. the developer's pride in his work have no effect 19 Table 6 shows that having an encouraging company policy towards revealing is significantly correlated with the number of years the firm has been developing embedded Linux (rho = 0.26, p = 0.005). Also, having a restrictive policy is significantly correlated with being a large firm (rho = 0.162, p = 0.082).
20 The ordered probit model implicitly assumes that the effects of the explanatory variables are identical at each cut-off point between categories (the "parallel regression assumption"). To check if this assumption is justified, I ran generalized ordered probit regressions using the GOPROBIT command in STATA 9. Due to issues with convergence, the parallel regression assumption was relaxed only for the three most important explanatory variables (those related to H4 -H6: OSSidentification, FreeSWideology, Pride). For none of these variables, the hypothesis of identical coefficients for all cut-off points could be rejected at the 10% level. Hence, the use of an ordered probit model instead of a generalized ordered probit model is justified.
on the frequency of his contributions can not be rejected. In contrast, the level of identification with the OSS community is significant in all specifications (1% level or 5% level). The effect size is large: an increase by two points has a stronger effect than a switch from no policy to an encouraging policy. H4 is thus supported. that "Pride" does not exhibit a significant effect, a similar conclusion can be drawn: just as ideology, personal vanity does not appear to be a driver of revealing.
Finally, also "ReasonsCommunity" and "ReasonsPersBenef" fail to be significant in all specifications, both individually and jointly. The interpretation is analogous to that given above for "FreeSWideology" and "Pride". Since these reasons are not related to the firm's benefits but to those of the community and the programmer himself, respectively, their being significant would be a worrying finding for firms. In turn, their insignificance is comforting for employers: even if a programmer attaches more importance to these reasons, he does not contribute more frequently to the OSS community. 22 One might conjecture that insignificance of "Pride" and "FreeSWideology" is caused by the fact that both are correlated with "OSSidentification". However, their insignificance persists when "OSSidentification" is dropped from the list of explanatory variables.
23 Such positive experiences are captured in statements from interviewees: "If it's a generic piece of code that is published as free SW, other people in the community will use that piece of code, find bugs, and will continue to improve it. The benefit we see there is lower support cost" (Interviewee 7, embedded Linux vendor, Europe). "Sharing that effort among many people makes it more likely that you have something good without additional work. It means that you have a support community" (Interviewee 8, embedded Linux vendor, US).
"When you need help the community will be there to help you" (Interviewee 9, embedded Linux expert, US).
This study contributes to the literature on open and distributed innovation and on the changes for firms that their diffusion entails. It employs methodological triangulation-30 in-depth interviews as well as a large-scale survey-to develop a robust and comprehensive picture.
The present paper goes beyond existing work by focusing on the employed OSS programmer as the link between his firm and the OSS community, and on potential principalagent problems between him and his employer. The latter can arise due to the programmer's double allegiance to his firm and the OSS community, and possible conflicts resulting from it.
The fact that, as I show, the developer has a strong say in revealing decisions compounds matters. Furthermore, this and other studies have found that community-related and personal motives do matter for commercial OSS programmers as reasons to reveal code. On the other hand, I have provided evidence that even when acting without management's awareness, OSS programmers may, by revealing code to OSS projects, in fact act in their firm's best interest.
The problem may rather lie with management who overestimates the risk and underestimates the benefits of openness. So, how severe is the potential principal-agent problem really?
Considering their attitudes towards OSS, commercial OSS programmers in my sample do, on average, identify with the OSS community and are somewhat ideological about Free
Software, but significantly less so than the reference group of non-commercial programmers.
As to the stated importance of non-firm-related motives to reveal code, improving one's personal skills matters significantly more for non-commercial programmers. For all other community-related and personal motives I do not find significant differences. In particular, revealing code "because I consider it fair to give back to the community" matters strongly for both groups-a finding well consistent with results from my interviews.
Now, a programmer's fairness towards and identification with the OSS community are not critical per se. Quite the contrary, both are required in order for the firm to capture the potential of OSS. 24 The question is, is the salience of the programmer's "OSS identity" in conflict situations strong enough to override his motivation to abide by the firm's interests?
Results obtained by regression analysis are reassuring for firms. I find that the frequency of a 24 Identification with the OSS community may even be an explicit company goal. Linux distributor Red Hat, e.g., states "Open source forms the foundation of our company's culture" (www.redhat.com/ about/culture/), and it appears plausible that they have to live up to this statement in order to remain successful.
programmer's contributions to public OSS projects is influenced neither by his level of "Free Software ideology," nor by the level of pride he takes in his work. Also the importance of community-related and personal motives to reveal does not show any significant influence.
What does exhibit a significant effect, however, is the programmer's level of identification with the OSS community. In light of the findings above, this identification must clearly be distinguished from ideology. As my interviews suggest (see Footnote 23), it will rather be based on positive experiences, in particular on support provided by community members to the respondent's work-which, in turn, is beneficial for his employer (cf. von Hippel, 1987, and Schrader, 1991 , for similar findings in the case of information trading). The two identities of a commercial OSS programmer may thus be not so much conflicting, but rather complementing. As Ashforth and Johnson (2001: 48) write somewhat poetically on the issue of conflicting identities, "instead of asking which hat to wear, perhaps we should switch metaphors and ask, say, how a diamond is revealed through its facets."
A limitation of this work is that, while the interviews spanned all hierarchical levels, the survey was directed towards developers. A complementing survey addressing managementor, ideally, various levels in each surveyed firm-would help to identify tensions between developer, middle, and upper management more clearly. A second limitation is that I use respondents' stated revealing behavior. Objective information extracted from Internet repositories will likely be difficult to obtain (given that programmers might contribute to different projects under different email addresses) and to match to the survey, but would be superior.
Finally, the majority of respondents work for hardware firms (which typically have their hardware as a complementary asset) or for software firms that perform commissioned development. Hence, applicability of my results to other OSS business models (e.g., maintenance) would need to be checked.
This paper points to a number of open questions. With a focus on the role of employed OSS programmers within their firms, my data provide relatively little insight into their role within the respective OSS community. Dahlander and Wallin (2006) address this aspect, focusing, however, on individuals who are explicitly sponsored by their firms to act strategically within the OSS community. Thus, an analysis of the role of the average commercial OSS programmer within his community is called for. Second, the dynamics of this role over time and of the programmer's attitudes requires further research, since it determines the sustainability of "commercial" OSS communities. David and Rullani (2006) and Rullani (2006) provide insightful studies of this dynamics, but address mainly non-commercial contributors.
Westenholz (2003) ers at the interface between firm and community is particularly high when, due to the extent of their activity, they qualify as boundary spanners (Allen, 1977; Tushman, 1977) . As such, they stimulate the innovation process by bridging organizational, and thus often also technical, boundaries.
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A specific recommendation for human resource management is to screen out, when hiring OSS developers, those with an overly strong ideological attitude towards the "freedom of software." In contrast, a job candidate's strong identification with the OSS community actually appears desirable for the prospective employer.
Tentative normative implications thus are not so much to monitor developers' revealing behavior more strictly, but rather to soften the stance towards intellectual property protection.
At the same time, the firm must provide clear policies in this regard, and make sure it does not attract and hire, as an "open" firm, avid supporters of "Free Software ideology."
Open and distributed innovation processes as observed in the field of OSS carry a high potential. In order to take full advantage of it, firms need to strike the right balance between 25 See Henderson and Clark (1990) . For the specific case of technical boundaries between commercial firms focusing on different technical fields within OSS development, see Henkel (2004b 4. "My company encourages me to contribute source code that is not critical for competition" 22.8% 4.6% 9.1% 8.6%
5. "My company is very restrictive in revealing code" 16.8% 4.1% 5.6% 2.0% 0.5% Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Marginal effect (n) relates to the n'th category of contribution behavior, see Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). N = 117.
